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Abstract 
In this paper, performance of a sample of 131 livestock traders in 38 rural Ethiopian 
highland markets  was analysed in terms of their costs and margins, how these were influenced 
by their assets and trading practices, and the implications of the findings for policy were outlined.   
 Most traders used own capital as access to credit, especially formal credit, was 
limited. The livestock market was characterised by non-standardised products and lack of 
information in the public domain about supply, demand and prices. Consequently, livestock 
trading was largely a personalised business though brokers and regular buyers and sellers,  a 
form of social capital,  were sometimes used for gathering information, searching 
buyers/sellers, price negotiation, contract enforcement. Business relationships with these 
intermediaries were principally based on trust,  without strong ethnic, religious or family ties. 
Although most transactions were conducted in physical presence of parties, contract 
violations were common, which were settled mainly through informal means as formal legal 
systems were either absent or time consuming. 
Estimated costs and margins of case transactions showed low returns, and losses  in 
some cases. Market levies, transport, travel, and feeds were major items of variable cost, with 
some variation between cattle and shoats. Multiple regression analysis showed that traders’ 
financial and human capital and trading practices like use of brokers and regular suppliers 
and customers had varying effects on margins and costs of cattle and shoat trade. Unstable 
price, multiple taxes, non-transparent tax system, limited access to credit and weak demand 
for the quality of the products traded were perceived by traders as major problems of 
marketing. All the problems were amenable to public policy for improving the market 
environment and marketing efficiency.  
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Introduction 
Well functioning markets facilitate easy conversion of products to cash, which further 
facilitate other exchanges of goods and services required for increased production and 
consumption. Markets promote specialisation and increased productivity and growth through 
realisation of comparative advantage and accessing regional and global markets. 
Commercialisation and market expansion are essential for exploiting the potential of any 
commodity in the economic development process. Commercialisation implies greater demand for 
inputs, information, credit  and other services including rules and norms for arranging contracts 
and their monitoring and enforcement to facilitate exchanges. Where one or more these 
supporting institutions are either absent or costly, exchanges either do not take place or are very 
limited (North, 1990; Nabil and Nugent, 1989). However, any particular institution, narrowly 
defined, may not be indispensable for market development and growth rather very different 
institutional structures may reasonably substitute for each other, both in dissimilar as well as 
similar contexts (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2003). The problem then is to identify the appropriate 
institutional form(s) for market development for a specific commodity in a given social, 
economic and political setting.  
Ethiopia has a large livestock population performing multiple functions in the economy 
but potential contribution of the sector to the economy is not fully exploited due to problems 
related to both domestic and export markets. Some studies have described the structure of 
livestock marketing as consisting of four tiers or layers from producers to consumers (Kebede et 
al., 1988; Kebede and Lambourne, 1985); others have shown that price differences between 
markets could be explained by transfer costs (Andargachew and Brokken,1993) but a recent 
study shows that prices differ significantly between seasons and intermarket price differences are 
significantly influenced by presence or absence of export buyers and processors, among other 
things (Ayele et al., 2005) . But little is know about how the different layers actually function, 
how market actors at different layers gather and exchange information,  interact, negotiate and 
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effect transactions, settle disputes, how costly and effective the transactions are, how effectively 
consumer prices are transmitted to producers and who benefits how much from market 
transactions, what kind of organizational and institutional arrangements support or hinder these 
transactions. Once trade linkages expand beyond local level across space and time, transaction 
costs related to monitoring and enforcement increase sharply, and the local social network or 
relationship needs to be replaced and complemented by formal organizations and institutions 
enforced by the state (North, 1989). 
Traders perform a key role in the Ethiopian livestock markets linking rural producers with 
rural and urban consumers. In this paper, performance of a sample of traders in terms of their 
costs and margins were assessed, how these were influenced by their assets and trading practices 
were analysed, and the implications of the findings for policy were outlined.   
 
Traders’ Performance :  A Conceptual Framework 
It is generally well known that in a competitive market a trading firm’s temporal or 
spatial arbitrage performance depends on its financial, physical and human capital as well as 
its ability to minimise costs.  There are   physical marketing costs, e.g. transport and storage, 
and transaction costs that arise from the coordination of the exchange among relevant market 
agents and include the costs of obtaining and processing market information, negotiating 
contracts, monitoring agents and enforcing contracts. Transaction costs are unique and 
specific to individual market agent, so each agent in the market conducts transactions on the 
basis of his/her own costs. When transaction costs are very high, market become thin or even 
fail (North, 1989; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Williamson, 1985; Gabre-Madhin, 2001).   
In some recent studies, the role of social capital in reducing transaction costs has been 
emphasized under the conditions of imperfect markets, weak property rights and contract 
enforcement conditions. It is argued that social capital creates trust among economic agents 
which helps to reduce transaction costs and improve profit margins (Fafchamps and Minten, 
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1999; Kranton, 1996, Landa, 1994). To these, Gabre-Madhin and Negassa (2004) have added 
the role of trading practices in trading performance. They define trading practices or the way 
exchanges are conducted as observable market behavioural outcomes of underlying market 
institutions. Market institutions encompass ‘rules of the game’ – rules and laws, informal 
norms, formal and informal organisations and associations. These institutions may determine 
trading practices with respect to, among others,  mode of purchase and  payment, inspection 
of goods, negotiation and enforcement of contracts, contract violations and means of 
settlement. Some examples of trading practices include use of regular suppliers and 
customers, and brokers/agents for purchase and sale, volume of purchase and sale through 
regulars and agents, cash or credit purchase and sales etc.  Trading practices may also be 
determined by type and composition of assets as firms operating under the same set of 
underlying market institutions often do not follow similar trading practices. In turn, trading 
practices may impact on traders’ performance through its influence on transaction costs. 
However, most trading practices are observable and measurable in some form but most  
transaction costs may not be observable and measurable.  
Thus, the relationships between trading performance, assets, trading practices and 
transaction costs outlined by Gabre-Madhin and Negassa (2004) may be specified in the 
following way: 
(1) Y = f( A; T,C), 
(2) A = f (M, K, H, S), 
where Y is a measure of  performance of a trader (volume of  business, margin or profit); A 
represents assets; M, K, H, S are respectively measures or proxies of  physical, financial, 
human and social capital; T is some indicator of trading practice(s) and C is transaction costs. 
Thus, a trading firm’s performance can be measured by profit subject to fixed resources, 
trading practices and costs. However, in empirical specification of any model to estimate 
parameters of these variables, two aspects need to be remembered. First, if Y is influenced by  
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A only because of their impact on T, then inclusion of T in an equation will result in 
insignificant coefficients for A because of the existence of multicollinearity between T and A. 
However, if all trading practices that matter can’t be identified and defined in the function, 
then inclusion of both T and A may not hamper results. Second, since T influences C and Ts 
are more easily observable and measurable than Cs, Ts may be considered as proxies for Cs.  
 In this paper we use this framework for assessing the performance of traders in live animal 
marketing in rural Ethiopian markets.  
 
Data source and general characteristics  
A  sample of  26 primary and 12 secondary rural livestock markets in the Tigray, 
Amhara and Oromiya highlands were surveyed in 2002.  Primary markets were defined as 
those serving local communities and an assembly point for supplying animals to secondary 
markets. Tertiary or terminal markets were not present in any of the districts surveyed. Each 
livestock market was located on one side of  larger multi-purpose market. In some secondary 
markets, there could be some fence or other demarcation mechanism to separate the livestock 
section from other commodity sections. Some primary markets met once a week, while other 
primary markets and all the secondary markets met twice a week on designated days.  
From the 38 livestock markets, 131 traders were selected:  63  (48%) were mainly or 
exclusively cattle traders and 68 (52%) were mainly or exclusively shoat traders. Most of the 
traders operated in more than one market. Data were collected using structured questionnaires 
on general characteristics of the traders, their assets and business practices and detailed 
information on  their arbitrage behaviour, transaction costs and margins with respect to the 
most recent completed purchase and sale transactions. 
The sample traders were generally young and they came from varied occupational 
backgrounds with only a few with either own or family background in trading. Most traders 
started business themselves with own capital as access to credit, especially formal credit, was  
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limited. The livestock market was characterised by non-standardised products and lack of 
information in the public domain about supply, demand and prices, so trading was largely a 
personalised business though   intermediaries, especially brokers, were used by about 28% 
traders for trading in distant markets and they conducted about 48% of volume of transactions 
through brokers. Traders also used a network of intermediaries, especially regular buyers and 
sellers, a form of social capital, with whom they had business relationships principally based 
on trust and without strong ethnic, religious or family ties. About 27% of the traders had 
regular suppliers and 37% had regular customers.  Personal observation through physical 
presence was the dominant mechanism to gather information on price, supply and demand in 
local markets: about 85% and 57% of traders obtained price information in local and distant 
markets in this manner.  Formal sources (radio, television and newspapers)  were used by a 
few for national and export market related information.  
Even though most transactions were conducted in physical presence of parties, 
contract violations were common, especially in case of credit transactions: sample traders 
experienced on average 23 contract violations per trader in 12 months preceding the survey. 
Most of these were resolved through informal negations as formal courts or other formal 
organisations were not easily accessible for quick resolution of disputes. Theft of animals 
either from stocking yards or en route to market was a major problem of property rights: 40% 
of the sample traders suffered from theft of animals during 12 months preceding the survey 
and they lost on average Birr 1345 ($157) per cattle trader and Birr 523 ($61) per shoat 
trader. Traders adopted various non-conventional means to avoid losses from this problem.  
In case of most recent transactions,  56.5% of the traders traded shoats and 43.5% traded 
cattle ( 14.5%  traded  yeferang1, and  29% traded other cattle). Forty six and 42% of cattle 
and shoat traders earned negative gross margin (gross revenue -  variable costs) of different 
magnitude; the average gross margin was -14% and -4% for cattle and shoat traders 
                                                 
1   A local expression used to refer to fattened and/or crossbred/exotic animals. 
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respectively. The structure of variable costs shows that transport (22%) travel (18.2%), 
market levies (15.9%) and feeds and water (14.9%) were major items of cost for cattle traders 
while these items accounted for 11.9, 20.5, 16.1 and 30% of cost for shoat traders. Net profit 
was not calculated because  adding fixed cost, especially capital cost for the search period of 
holding stock,  would further reduce the gain or increase the losses as the case may be.2   
 
Explaining  trader’s performance : Empirical model 
 Profit is the ultimate objective of a firm though performance can be assessed by 
volume of business or cost per unit. In the present study, profit was not calculated as 
explained above.  However, gross margin is a measure of return on own labour and capital, so 
can be a good indicator of business performance as minimisation of variable costs will lead to 
increased gross margin. Also variable costs may be influenced by various factors including 
assets and trading practices.  Therefore, both variable cost and gross margin per traded animal  
were considered as indicators of performance and a model of the following form was used to 
identify their determinants: 
 (3)  VC/animal  = f( X1, C1, e1) 
 (4)        GM/animal  = f(X2, C2, e2) 
where X is a set of qualitative (discrete) variables each with more than one category, C is a 
set of quantitative variables (covariates), and e is an error term. X and C include  asset 
variables, variables representing trading practices as proxies for transaction costs (as trading 
practices were observable and measurable but most transaction costs were not), and other 
general variables. Two specifications of equation 4 were estimated : (a) X2 was the same as 
X1 assuming that  the variables that were significant in equation 3 would serve as proxies for 
                                                 
2 However, the apparent negative and low returns could be due to over-reporting of costs or under-reporting of 
prices  or reporting transactions on which  margins were low,  or these transactions took place at times when the 
market in general was low.   More such case studies might provide clearer answers.  
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variable cost, (b)  the variables in X1 that were statistically significant at least at 10% level 
were excluded and VC/animal was included as an explanatory variable in order to avoid 
problems of endogeneity.  
Double log formulation could give direct estimates of elasticities but could not be 
used as gross margin was negative in a good number of cases. So, GLM procedure in SPSS 
V.12 was used to estimate parameters separately for cattle and shoats as it gave better fits 
than OLS. For equation 4, option b gave better fits though both options have been used for 
interpretation of results (Table 1 and 2).  
 The set of variables significantly influencing unit cost and margin, and  in some cases 
the nature of influence, varied between cattle and shoat trade. The model for cattle explained 
54% of variation in variable costs and  62% of variation in gross margin (Table 1). Other 
things being equal, none of asset variables- human, financial or social- significantly 
influenced unit variable cost but size of working capital significantly reduced unit gross 
margin and non-specialisation in livestock trade and number of workers engaged in trade 
significantly increased unit margin. Theoretically larger working capital would normally be 
expected to permit larger volume of business and economy of scale and  specialisation in 
livestock trade would be expected to generate better profits due to better knowledge and skills 
in trade negotiations, therefore the coefficients of these variables were contrary to 
expectations. The significant positive effect of labour and negative impact of working capital 
on margin indicate the relative importance of labour in the highly personalised business and 
the need for personal involvement in collection of information, searching buyers and sellers, 
making negotiations, ensuring contract enforcement – all of which may increase unit cost and 
reduce margin.  Borrowing and knowledge about a larger network of traders and brokers did 
not have any significant effect on unit variable cost or gross margin. 
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Table 1. Determinants of variable cost and gross margin per cattle  
Variables Variable cost Gross margin 1 Gross margin 2 
 B(St error) B(St error) B(St. error) 
Intercept 109.963 
(141.482) 
-18.927 
(194.687) 
-106.383 
(187.053 
Asset variables 
Schooling of trader (years) 
 
0.437 
(4.692) 
 
4.446 
(6.668) 
 
-2.606 
(6.756) 
Business age/experience (yrs)  -2.969 
(4.045) 
3.619 
(5.890) 
-6.080 
(5.793) 
Occupation other than livestock trade 
(yes=1, no=0) 
-81.986 
(57.111) 
229.168*** 
(77.669) 
181.472** 
(79.018) 
No of workers  -64.223 
(49.279) 
108.072* 
(65.771) 
161.332** 
(73.466) 
Working capital (birr) 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
Borrowing (no=0, yes=1) -25.225 
(80.668) 
33.898 
(101.322) 
126.522 
(112.614) 
N of traders/brokers known 0.000 
(0.426) 
-0.471 
(0.533) 
-0.473 
(0.574) 
Trading practices variables 
Purchase/sale to regulars  
(no=0, yes= 1) 
 
-7.197 
(67.931) 
 
-92.844 
(84.364) 
 
-152.105** 
(78.231) 
Use of broker  
(no=0, yes=1) 
263.389*** 
(87.629) 
-236.819** 
(118.527) 
na 
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Purchase and sale market distances 
(km)  
0.641* 
(0.357) 
0.073 
(0.494) 
na 
Days between purchase and sale 14.881*** 
(3.094) 
-16.213*** 
(3.874) 
na 
Other variables 
Variables cost/animal (Birr) 
 
na 
 
na 
 
-0.744*** 
(0.168) 
Cattle type   
(other =1, yeferang = 0) 
123.685* 
(73.653) 
29.586 
(100.505) 
217.034** 
(85.226) 
Market traded  
(primary =0, secondary =1) 
-92.614 
(77.785) 
-87.050 
(114.504) 
234.728** 
(109.917) 
Oromiya region+ 2.912 
(89.193) 
180.673 
(111.681) 
121.550 
(116.214) 
Amhara region+ 61.690 
(116.320) 
68.041 
(145.646) 
230.222* 
(135.14) 
R2  
Adj (R2 )  
0.54 
0.36 
0.56 
0.37 
0.62 
0.56 
 
+ Tigray region is the base     
 ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1, 5 and 10% levels using Bonferroni confidence interval.  
Source: Field survey and authors’ estimates 
 Among the  variables related to trading practices, use of brokers in purchase or sale 
transactions and longer temporal arbitrage significantly increased unit cost and reduced gross 
margin; purchase and sale to regulars had no significant effect on unit cost but significantly 
reduced unit gross margin. Longer spatial arbitrage significantly increased unit cost and  
indirectly contributed to lower margin. In theory, use of brokers and business with regulars 
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are supposed to reduce unit cost by minimising transaction cost, especially search, 
negotiation, contract violation and settlement costs. However, if these functions can’t be done 
personally due to labour constraint so brokers and regular buyers and sellers are used, then 
chances of making less margin compared to personalised business with larger labour input 
(see above)  could be high. Compared to yeferang, both unit costs and gross margins were 
higher for other local cattle perhaps because unit costs for yeferang were far too high in 
relation to the final revenue. 
 Although unit costs were not significantly different between trading activities in 
primary and secondary markets, unit margins were significantly higher in the secondary 
markets perhaps because of better price margins between primary and secondary markets. 
Unit costs did not vary significantly between the three regions but unit margin was mildly 
significantly higher in Amhara region. 
 The model for shoats explained  35% of variation in variable cost and 78% of 
variation in gross margin per unit (Table 2). Other things being equal, among the asset 
variables, larger size of working capital significantly reduced unit cost and increased unit 
margin, which would be expected, but knowledge about a larger network of traders/brokers 
significantly increased unit cost and reduced margin. In case of the latter, perhaps the 
knowledge about a large network was not conveniently used to reduce costs or get better 
prices by gathering information, making negotiations, enforcing contracts, minimizing 
contract violations and settling disputes. It was shown earlier that students and some better 
educated people were engaged in livestock trade, this could be mainly due to lack of 
alternative job opportunities. However, education level did not affect unit cost but 
significantly reduced unit margin, indicating that perhaps in the rural market environment, 
formal education might not confer any particular advantage. Business experience and number  
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Table 2. Determinants of variable cost and gross margin per shoat   
Variables Variable cost  Gross margin 1 Gross margin 2 
 B(St.error) B (st. error) B(St.error) 
Intercept -17.151 
(22.226) 
8.462 
(24.402) 
-5.689 
(14.682) 
Asset variables 
Schooling of trader (years) 
 
0.118 
(0.579) 
 
-0.721 
(0.636) 
 
-0.618* 
(0.354) 
Business age/experience (yrs) 0.226 
(0.525) 
-0.066 
(0.576) 
0.007 
(0.331) 
Occupation other than livestock 
trade  
(yes=1, no=0) 
7.643 
(7.270) 
-10.226 
(7.981) 
-2.174 
(4.778) 
N of workers  -2.060 
(2.913) 
1.787 
(3.199) 
-0.079 
(1.842) 
Working capital  (Birr) -0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
na 
Borrowing  
(no=0, yes=1) 
1.983 
(7.886) 
-2.207 
(8.658) 
-2.178 
(5.158) 
N of  other traders/brokers 
know 
0.184*** 
(0.067) 
-0.228*** 
(0.074) 
na 
Trading practices variables 
Regulars used in purchase/sale  
(no=0, yes=1) 
 
-10.293 
(7.095) 
 
15.472** 
(7.790) 
 
4.686 
(4.573) 
Broker use in purchase/sale -5.085 -2.011 -3.638 
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(no=0, yes=1) (12.374) (13.586) (7.951) 
Purchase and sale market 
distances (km) 
0.115*** 
(0.040) 
-0.142*** 
(0.044) 
na 
Days between purchase and 
sale 
-0.083 
(0.169) 
-0.101 
(0.186) 
-0.176 
(0.110) 
Other variables 
Variable cost/animal (Birr) 
 
na 
 
na 
 
-0.959*** 
(0.079) 
Market traded  
(Primary =0, secondary = 1) 
1.122 
(8.517) 
-9.448 
(9.351) 
-3.686 
(5.094) 
Oromiya region+ -4.335 
(13.522 
-12.155 
(14.146) 
-15.944* 
(8.844) 
Amhara region+ -15.517 
(13.282) 
-0.684 
(14.583) 
-14.280 
(8.817) 
R2 
Adj R2 
0.35 
0.19 
0.41 
0.26 
0.78 
0.73 
+ Tigray region is the base            ***, ** and * as in table 9.  
Source: Field survey and authors’ estimates 
 
of workers engaged in the business did not significantly influence unit cost or margin. The 
insignificance of labour may be partly because of the fact that compared to cattle, a single 
person can handle a larger number of shoats, so economy of labour economy may not show 
until the number of animals handles is fairly large.  
 Among the variables related to trading practices, use of regulars in purchase and sale 
had no effect on unit cost but significantly increased margin; but broker use had no 
significant effect on unit cost or margin. Longer spatial arbitrage significantly increased unit 
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cost and reduced unit margin but longer temporal arbitrage did not affect unit cost or margin. 
Unit cost and margin did not differ significantly between primary and secondary markets or 
between the three regions but unit margin was mildly significantly lower in Oromiya.  
Summary and conclusions  
A survey on 131 livestock traders in 38 rural primary and secondary markets in the 
highlands of Ethiopia in 2002 provided data for assessing trader performance. Estimated 
costs and margins of recently completed transactions showed low returns and losses on 
investment in about 40-45% cases. Analysis of the structure of variable costs  showed  that 
most costs were physical marketing costs. Multiple regression analyses using variable cost 
per animal and gross margin per animal traded as indicators of performance showed that  
traders’ financial and human capital, especially labour, and trading practices like use of 
brokers and regular suppliers and customers as proxies for transaction costs had significant 
effects on costs and margins with some differences between cattle and shoat trade. 
Unstable price, multiple taxes, non-transparent tax system, limited access to credit and 
weak demand for the products traded were perceived by traders as major problems of 
marketing, all of which are amenable to public policy for improving the market environment 
and marketing efficiency. Inadequate market information, infrastructure, government support, 
and existence of unlicensed traders and weak legal system, were mentioned as problems by 
very few traders. Alleviating these constraints along with improving market information and 
upgrading marketing infrastructures will potentially increase the welfare of smallholder 
producers and urban consumers. Rationalising taxes will improve traders’ income and that 
will allow them to offer better prices to producers. Also more trader awareness about market 
demand and price will increase their ability to transmit information to producers to  improve 
production, both in terms of quantity and quality, thereby benefiting consumers. 
Price instability for crops is a major problem affecting food security, poverty 
alleviation, agricultural growth and overall performance of the economy. Given strong 
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linkages between crop and livestock production and marketing decisions, the issue of price 
stabilisation needs to be addressed simultaneously for both crop and livestock sub-sectors.  
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